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LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
error discoverable on the face of the pleadings, without reference to
the evidence, the supreme court remains limited in its appellate re-
view to errors "designated in the assignment of errors." Louisiana has
no procedure analogous to the doctrine of "plain error" such as is
found in the federal rules."8
To some critics, the effect of Act 207 of 1974 is insignificant. They
argue that it does little more than to replace the bill of exceptions
with an assignment of error, since both must be filed at the trial level
and both serve to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
court. They contend that the assignment should be made to the su-
preme court and that the whole process should not preclude review
of a point properly objected to either orally or by written motion. 9
Possibly such changes should be considered in the future. Never-
theless, the writer submits that Act 207 of 1974 has given some signifi-
cant flexibility to the appellate review of criminal cases. It is hoped
that the supreme court will treat the new procedure as a relaxation
of the technicalities associated with the bill of exceptions.
OBSCENITY REGULATION
The landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Miller v. California' prompted the Louisiana supreme court to invali-
28. FED. R. CraM. P. 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
Perhaps as a consequence of the absence of the plain error doctrine, Louisiana courts
have often been called upon to determine the scope of the exception as to errors "patent
on the face of the record." See City of Baton Rouge v. Norman, 290 So. 2d 865 (La.
1974); State v. Chighizola, 281 So. 2d 702 (La. 1973); State v. Davis, 278 So. 2d 130
(La. 1973); State v. Comeaux, 277 So. 2d 647 (La. 1973); State v. Raby, 259 La. 909,
253 So. 2d 370 (1971); State v. Austin, 255 La. 108, 229 So. 2d 717 (1969), appeal after
remand, 258 La. 273, 246 So. 2d 12 (1971); State v. Palmer, 251 La. 759, 206 So. 2d
485 (1968).
29. When a federal constitutional right is involved, the refusal of the supreme
court to review the complaint on appeal spawns problems of collateral review. See
Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974); Lawrence v. Henderson, 478
F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Woodfox, 291 So. 2d 388 (La. 1974); State v. Flana-
gan, 250 La. 100, 222 So. 2d 872 (1969). The writer submits that the supreme court
should be able, under the new procedure, to receive late filings of assignment of errors
to avoid collateral litigation of constitutional issues. Art. 844 simply requires the filing
of the assignment "within the time specified by the trial judge." The return date is
not mentioned. The supreme court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction (Lk.
CONST. art. V, § 5(A)), should be able to authorize or order late filing of assignment of
error. This is a logical and necessary approach when constitutional questions are pro-
perly raised at the trial level. See State v. Moseley, 284 So. 2d 749 (La. 1973).
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973);
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date our state statutory regulation of obscenity. In State v. Shreve-
port News Agency, Inc.' and State v. McNutt,3 the court declared
that Louisiana's definition of obscenity was unconstitutional. Simi-
larly, in Gulf States Theatres v. Richardson' and State v. Gulf States
Theatres,5 the court held the state nuisance statute unconstitutional
when used to regulate obscenity. During the 1974 regular session, the
legislature passed three important acts' designed to fill the void cre-
ated by these recent decisions.
Act 274 - Definition of Obscenity
Although first amendment protection does not extend to obscen-
ity, the danger of restricting protected expression requires that stat-
utes regulating obscenity be narrowly drawn.' Beginning with Roth
v. United States,' which formulated the requirement that the work
as a whole appeal to prurient interest,' the United States Supreme
Court has attempted to enunciate a permissible standard for judging
obscenity. Later cases applied the tests of "patent offensiveness""
and utter lack of "redeeming social importance,"" and in A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts," the Court combined these three standards and re-
quired that each be independently satisfied before the work could be
judged obscene. In Miller, the Court re-stated the three part test'3
and declared that the states may regulate only descriptions or depic-
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973);
United States v. Twelve Two Hundred Foot Reels of Super Eight Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973).
2. 287 So. 2d 464 (La. 1973).
3. 287 So. 2d 478 (La. 1973).
4. 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973).
5. 287 So. 2d 496 (La. 1973).
6. La. Acts 1974, Nos. 274, 275, 277. Enactments of lesser importance passed
during the session were Acts 279 and 496 (prohibiting lewd, immoral or improper
conduct or practices at premises holding on-sale permits for beverages of low and high
alcoholic content) and Act 180 (regulating motion picture ratings).
7. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. Id. at 489.
10. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
11. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
12. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
13. (1) The average person applying contemporary community standards must
find that the work appeals to prurient interest, (2) the work must depict or describe
patently offensive hard-core sexual conduct specifically defined by state law, and (3)
the work must lack serious literary, artistic, political or social value. 413 U.S. at 24.
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tions of hard-core sexual conduct. 4 Miller listed a few "plain exam-
ples" of material constituting hard-core obscenity: patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, masturbation,
excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the genitals." In the recent
case of Jenkins v. Georgia,'" the Court repeated the examples given
in Miller and stated that the states may also proscribe "anything
sufficiently similar to such materials to justify similar treatment."' 7
Section one of Act 274 adopts the three part Miller test of obscen-
ity and defines by means of an extensive list what the legislature
considers to be "patently offensive hard-core sexual conduct."' 8 Some
of the activities included in the definition, such as ultimate sex acts, 9
are almost identical to the "plain examples" of hard-core sexual con-
duct given in Miller, and thus prohibition of materials depicting such
conduct is constitutional. However, other sections of the definition of
hard-cord obscenity in Act 274 may exceed the constitutional limita-
tions of Miller and Jenkins. Nudity is arguably included; 0 yet the
Court has declared that "nudity alone is not enough to make material
legally obscene under the Miller standards."'" Finally, the definition
lists such things as sadomasochistic abuse,2 acts of apparent sexual
14. Id. at 27.
15. Id. at 25-26.
16. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
17. Id. at 161.
18. Since the second part of the Miller test is the most troublesome, the following
analysis is limited to a discussion of Act 274's attempt to fulfill the requirement that
the state statute must prohibit specifically defined hard-core sexual conduct.
19. LA. R.S. 14:106A(2)(a) (Supp. 1974): "Ultimate sexual acts, normal or per-
verted, actual, simulated or animated, whether between human beings, animals or an
animal and a human being...." LA. R.S. 14:106A(2)(b) (Supp. 1974): "Masturba-
tion, excretory functions or lewd exhibition, actual, simulated or animated, of the
genitals . . . anus [or] vulva. .. "
20. See LA. R.S. 14:106A(2)(b) (Supp. 1974): "lewd exhibition, actual, simulated
or animated, of the . . . pubic hair [or] female breast nipples. . . ." Although the
above section of the Act does not proscribe nudity per se, a strong argument can be
made that the prohibited depictions, (e.g., lewd exhibition of female breast nipples)
are in fact attempts to include conduct that can be more properly classified as "mere
nudity" than "patently offensive hard-core sexual conduct." See also LA. R.S.
14:106A(2)(d) (Supp. 1974): "[alctual, simulated, or animated, touching, carressing
or fondling of, or other physical contact with, a . . . female breast nipple, covered or
exposed, whether alone or between humans, animals or a human and an animal, of
the same or opposite sex, in an apparent act of sexual stimulation or gratifica-
tion .. "
21. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (declaring the movie "Carnal
Knowledge" could not be found obscene under the Miller standards).
22. LA. R.S. 14:106A(2)(c) (Supp. 1974): "Sadomasochistic abuse, meaning
actual, simulated or animated, flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude
19751
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gratification23 and artificial stimulation of human genital organs.' 4
This expansion upon the "plain examples" given in Miller was under-
taken by the legislature without intelligible guidelines, apart from
the elusive concepts that the activity must be "patently offensive
hard-core sexual conduct ' '2 and of "sufficient similarity"" to clearly
hard-core conduct to justify similar treatment. It is in this area that
''one can not say with certainty that material is obscene until at least
five members of [the] Court, applying inevitably obscure standards,
have pronounced it so."27
Act 274 purports to proscribe violent material, 8 even though the
United States Supreme Court has never declared such material to be
outside of the limits of constitutional protection." Indeed, many great
works of literature would appear to fall within the ambit of this
statutory prohibition." It is not clear under what circumstances pro-
hibition of violent material may be permissible or whether the Court
would apply the talismanic approach of Roth, the traditional clear
and present danger test or would adopt a new balancing test in this
uncharted first amendment area. 1 However, other states which had
previously enacted regulations dealing with violent materials have
since repealed them, 32 and recent attempts to prohibit such materials
or clad in undergarments or in a costume which reveals the pubic hair, anus, vulva,
genitals or female breast nipples, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise
physically restrained, on the part of one so clothed .. "
23. LA. R.S. 14:106A(2)(d) (Supp. 1974): "Actual, simulated or animated, touch-
ing, caressing or fondling of or other similar physical contact with, a pubic area [or]
anus. . . covered or exposed, whether alone or between humans, animals or a human
and an animal, of the same or opposite sex, in an act of apparent sexual stimulation
or gratification .. "
24. LA. R.S. 14:106A(2)(e) (Supp. 1974): "Actual, simulated or animated stimula-
tion of a human organ by any device whether or not the device is designed, manufac-
tured or marketed for such purpose."
25. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
26. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
27. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
28. LA. R.S. 14:106A(6) (Supp. 1974): "'Violent material' is any tangible work or
thing which the trier of facts determines depicts actual or simulated patently offensive
acts of violence, including but not limited to, acts depicting sadistic conduct, whip-
pings, beatings, torture and mutilation of the human body."
29. The only time this issue was before the Court was in Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948), which was decided on the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
30. A plausible interpretation of the statute would prohibit the teaching of such
classics as the Iliad in high school English classes.
31. See Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1149 (1967).
32. See, e.g., Law of March 26, 1885, ch. 47, § 2, [1885] Conn. Laws ch. 329, §
6245 (repealed 1935); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 30 (1933), as amended by Mass. Acts
[Vol. 35
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have evoked criticism, indicating that regulation of violent material
is of questionable constitutionality.3
The Act also proscribes indecent exposure." Because the danger
of impinging upon protected first amendment expression is much less
when the state regulates indecent exposure than when it attempts to
prohibit obscenity, more flexibility is given the state in defining the
crime of indecent exposure. 5 The requirement that "intent of arous-
ing sexual desire" be proven as an essential element of the crime of
indecent exposure dispels any doubt as to the constitutionality of this
section of the Act. The statutory language does not allow punishment
for activity arguably protected by the first amendment, such as pub-
lic nudity in the nature of symbolic protest.
An adversary hearing prior to arrest is provided by the Act, al-
though there is an exception for arrest without a hearing when the
offense charged is depiction of ultimate sex acts."8 Since a pre-arrest
hearing is not constitutionally compelled in any instance," the excep-
tion is permissible. If the alleged violation involves the questionable
sections of the Act, the hearing procedures might provide the easiest
method of successfully contesting the validity of those sections. Even
if portions of the Act are declared unconstitutional, the severability
provision insures that other portions will not be affected.3 8
Act 275 - Regulation of Material Harmful to Minors
Obscenity is a concept which varies in its coverage, depending
on the group that will be exposed to the materials.3 9 The United
1974, ch., 430; Laws of April 4, 1917, ch. 242, § 1 [1917] Minn. Stat. § 617.72 (repealed
1963); Mont. Rev. Code § 11134 (1935), as amended by Mont. Acts 1967, ch. 276; Laws
of March 31, 1887, ch. 113, § 4 [1887] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-924 (repealed 1961).
33. See comments to New York Penal Law § 235.00 (Supp. 1974); Zellick,
Violence as Pornography, 1970 CRIM. L. REv. (ENGLISH) 188; Comment, 67 COLUM L.
REv. 1149 (1967).
34. LA. R.S. 14:106A(1) (Supp. 1974).
35. "[T]he States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct
than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same behavior." Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973).
36. LA. R.S. 14:106F(1) (Supp. 1974).
37. Milky Way Prod., Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per
curiam sub nom., New York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970).
38. La. Acts 1974, No. 274 § 2.
39. "[The concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to
the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quaran-
tined." Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1966),
appeal dismissed sub nom., Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12 (1966). Conversely,
19751
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States Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York4" affirmed a convic-
tion based upon the sale to a minor of material that would not have
been considered obscene for adults. The variable obscenity concept
has been incorporated into Act 275 by defining obscenity in terms of
material which is harmful to minors.
Section one of Act 275 defines material harmful to minors as any
tangible work or thing which:
exploits, is devoted to or principally consists of, descriptions or
depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality for commercial gain,
and when the trier of facts determines that the average person
applying contemporary community standards would find that
the work or thing is presented in a manner to provoke or arouse
lust, passion or perversion or exploits sex.4"
This language, when read in conjunction with the Act's definition of
"descriptions of depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality,"42 basi-
cally incorporates the first two Miller guidelines.43 Even mere nudity
may be labelled obscene for minors" and, therefore, Act 275's prohibi-
tion of nudity or sexual activity involving nudity is valid.
On the other hand, the Act has failed to include the third
requirement of Miller-that "the work, taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political or scientific value."4 5 However, in
Jacobellis v. Ohio," where this requirement was first stated, the
Court recognized that an appropriately drafted variable obscenity
statute could survive constitutional scrutiny even though it lacked
the third requirement.47 Furthermore, the Court has stated that the
states may "accord minors under 17 a more restricted right than that
assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex
material they may read or see."48 In view of these pronouncements,
a statute which restricts adults to reading what is fit for children is unconstitutional.
See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
40. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
41. LA. R.S. 14:91.11(A) (Supp. 1974).
42. LA. R.S. 14:91.11A(1-5) (Supp. 1974).
43. See note 13 supra.
44. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631-33 (1968).
45. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
46. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
47. See State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959), cited in Jacobellis as
containing an example of an appropriately drafted variable obscenity statute, despite
its lack of the third requirement.
48. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968).
[Vol. 35
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the lack of the third Miller guideline should not render the Act uncon-
stitutional. 9
Variable obscenity statutes upheld as constitutional in other
states provide that the trier of fact is to determine whether the mate-
rial appeals to the prurient interest of minors.50 Act 275 includes the
prurient appeal requirement," but fails to indicate whether the mate-
rial can be judged obscene because it appeals to the prurient interest
of minors or whether it must appeal to the prurient interest of adults.
Since the apparent legislative intent was to enact one statute defining
obscenity for the general public and another more strictly defining
material harmful to minors,52 it seems that the material should be
judged on the basis of its appeal to the prurient interest of minors.
Obscenity statutes cannot impose absolute criminal liability,
but must contain an element of scienter.5 3 Both Act 274 and Act 275,
by providing that the activities they proscribe must involve specific
intent, contain the requisite element of scienter 4
Act 277 - Regulation of Obscenity Through Nuisance Statutes
Regulation of obscenity by a properly drawn nuisance statute is
constitutionally permissible.55 Since Act 277, which declares obscene
materials to constitute a nuisance, is keyed to the criminal statutes
defining obscene materials,5" any infirmities in the latter will infect
the former. In regulation of obscenity under the nuisance statute,
49. Regarding the state's authority to restrict material directed towards minors,
see generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 939 (1963); 30 ALBANY L. REV. 133, 138 (1966); Note, 54 GEO. L.J. 1379 (1966).
50. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965), held constitutional in
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.013(1) (1969), held
constitutional in Davison v. State, 288 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE
9.68.050 (1969) held constitutional in City of Tacoma v. Naubert, 491 P.2d 652 (Wash.
1971).
51. In Roth, the Court defined material appealing to prurient interest as "material
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957). Act 275
requires that the objectionable material "provoke or arouse lust, passion or perversion
or exploits sex."
52. Compare the preamble of La. Acts 1974, No. 274 with that of No. 275.
53. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
54. Use of the word "intentional" and the phrase "with the intent" in prior Louis-
iana statutes regulating obscenity and material harmful to minors has been held to
fulfill the scienter requirements of the Smith case. Delta Book Distrib., Inc. v. Cron-
vich, 304 F. Supp. 662, 669 (E.D. La. 1969); State v. Roufa, 241 La. 474, 483-84, 129
So. 2d 743, 747 (1961). Therefore, Act 274's use of the "intentional" and Act 275's use
of "intentional" and "with the intent" satisfy scienter requirements.
55. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
56. LA. R.S. 13:4711 (Supp. 1974).
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abatement is not an authorized remedy,5" and the statute thereby
avoids prior restraint "in the context of its historical origin.""8
Strict procedural safeguards insure that the public's right to the
unobstructed circulation of constitutionally protected material5' will
not be infringed. Act 277 provides that after a petition for injunction
has been filed, a preliminary hearing must be held within twenty-four
hours of service upon the adverse party. 6 At the preliminary hearing
an independent judicial determination of obscenity must be made in
order to warrant injunctive relief.' A similar procedure received ap-
proval by the United States Supreme Court in Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown.6"
The new nuisance statute insures the speedy judicial determina-
tion "3 required in this area.64 A suspensive appeal to the appropriate
appellate court is provided, and the court is required to hear the
appeal with the "greatest possible expedition." 5 The suspensive ap-
peal protects the public's right of access to material arguably within
the protection of the first amendment and avoids restraint of material




58. Gulf States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489-92
(La. 1973); See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
59. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Gulf
States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973).
60. LA. R.S. 13:4713 (Supp. 1974).
61. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3601 provides in pertinent part: "An injunction shall
issue in cases where irreparable injury, loss or damage may otherwise result to the
applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law ... " Since the regulation of
obscenity is specifically provided by law and the criminal law guidelines in Acts 274
and 275 are the basis for determining whether or not an injunction shall issue, it is
not necessary to allege or prove irreparable injury, loss or damage. See Whalen v.
Brinkmann, 258 So. 2d 145, 147 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (petition for injunction to
prohibit creditor and sheriff from selling debtor's property to satisfy creditor's judg-
ment).
62. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
63. LA. R.S. 13:4713 (Supp. 1974) provides that an adversary hearing shall be had
not less than five nor more than ten days after the preliminary hearing, regardless of
whether a preliminary injunction issues, and that judgment shall be rendered within
forty-eight hours of the conclusion of the adversary hearing.
64. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
65. LA. R.S. 13:4713 (Supp. 1974).
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